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"A TERRIBLE BUSINESS"

Several weeks ago, in my request to faculty for annual reports,
I quoted a passage from Richard Merrill's recent book, Teaching Values
in College.

The theme of that book, more than the title of this address,

reveals the broad topic I want to raise with you this morning.
source of my title will become apparent in a few moments.

The

For now, let

me simply say the the broad topic has to do with issues of integrity,
truth, and values in higher education.
The immediate provocation for this speech was a conversation
with Dean Lauter in which he remarked on the increasing number of cases
heard by the Lawrence Honor Council in recent years.
of cases has doubled from 1971-72 to 1981-82.

In fact, the number

That observation, of course,

could be made about American colleges and universities generally and is
graphically illustrated by an episode two years ago at the University of
Maryland.

As students prepared to use the multiple exits to leave a large

examination room, all doors but one were closed and locked.

As the students

filed out the remaining exit, they were stopped for an i.d. check designed
to ferret out "ringers" who had taken the exam for other students.

The

Maryland sting operation rounded up several such ringers and constituted
the university's most dramatic response to what had become a serious
epidemic of cheating.
The Maryland case was but a dramatic instance of what has
become a pervasive phenomenon in higher education.

In the 1950 1 s, Tom

Lehrer earned fame and fortune on his witty lyrics, "plagiarize, plagiarize,
let no one's work evade your eyes" but in the 1980's this is no longer a
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laughing business.

In various surveys taken in 1980, one-third of the

students at Princeton, Dartmouth, Amherst, and Johns Hopkins admitted
to cheating at least once and two-thirds of the undergraduates at Stanford
confessed to plagiarizing papers.

On some campuses, students have broken

into computer files to alter grades while off campus a new service industry
has emerged to sell pre-written term papers on a wide variety of topics.
One such company, currently under investigation by the U.S. Postal Service,
had over 10,000 essays for sale and advertised them in college newspapers
as "a solution at last to the student's term paper problems."
These forms of dishonesty have, at the same time, been accompanied
by other, no less serious episodes.

The theft and/or destruction of books

has reached such proportions that some large institutions are suffering
losses in the millions of dollars annually.

In our community, similar

behavior appeared to occur with alarming frequency last year with books taken
from both the library and from students at Downer or in the halls.
Undergraduates are not the only culprits here.

It was recently

reported that the man nominated to be the state education commissioner in
New Jersey had turned in a 121-page doctoral thesis,

66 pages of which

were lifted verbatim from seven sources with no attribution or acknowledgment.

To make matters even more ludicrous, the man defended the practice

by labeling his graduate program "experimental" and referring to his dissertation as a "major departure from a strictly scholarly approach."
surely merits that assessment, as well as a few others.

It

Like deceitful.

Blatant deceit of this sort has occurred in the upper reaches of
academe as well.

In a celebrated case that began in 1979, it was determined

after an extensive scientific audit that two Yale professors had plagiarized

- 3 -

a research paper;

further investigation uncovered the fact that one of them

had engaged in fudging, fabrication, and widespread destruction of laboratory
data.

To date, eleven papers have been retracted from the scientific liter-

ature; two hitherto promising and productive careers in science have been
aborted.
These examples are distressing enough, but what is equally appalling is the way in which people have responded to this wrong-doing.

Students

have rationalized their cheating by referring to the pressures of a tight

job market, of graduate school admission standards, or family expectations
of achievement.

Academic professionals make similar claims, with one of

the Yale researchers claiming that his actions "were done in the midst

of significant pressure to publish these data as fast as possible so as
to obtain priority."

Fabrication and plagiarism were employed in order to

achieve recognition and results.
What we have, in large part, is a situation in which the motivation
and justification for intellectual accomplishment are extrinsic to the
academic enterprise itself.

The enterprise itself is not perceived as

inherently worthwhile and honorable but is seen merely to be a means to
some other ends.

And it is in service to or out of fear of those other

ends that individuals seem prepared to cheat.

If plagiarizing a paper

will elevate my grade, enhance my GPA, raise my class rank, and thereby
improve my credentials for some post-graduate position, then plagiarize I
will.

There is, of course, a lazy version of this same instinct which accepts

cheating--by copying a paper or even buying one--simply because it is easier
than working on one's own.
The result is a cavalier and utilitarian view of honesty.
When ulterior motives prevail or when the opportunity to cut corners

- 4 -

arises, the activity of the moment--be it a paper, an examination, or an
experiment--loses its absolute and inherent meaning and takes on a relative
one.

It is shaped not by a set of values pertaining to the activity, but

by its relationship to some other desideratum.

This situation perhaps should distress us more than it surprises
us.

For the extent to which intellectual activity is perceived to have no

intrinsic worth, to the extent to which higher education is viewed simply
and solely as a path to some job, the values embedded in intellectual
activity and academic inquiry will be ignored or denigrated.

The problem,

I believe, is not that students don't understand the provisions of the

Honor Code, but that they have not been led to appreciate the fundamental
nature of what we do in the university.
Writing in 1968, Douglas Heath expressed this nature well.
11

lntellectual activity, 11 he argued,

11

requires honesty, objectivity,

openness to alternatives, flexibility, humility, respect for dissenting
views, and so on.
about what is

Associated with intellectual activity is an ethic

app~opriate

intellectual activity.

A person who fabricates

or distorts information, consciously ignores contradictory data, plagiarizes
the work of others, and interprets information to fit some purpose other
than truth loses the trust and respect of others.

A liberal education

must educate for the ethic of truth if it is not to produce intellectual
psychopaths.

11

The ethic of truth is, by its very nature and essence, a demanding
and embracing ethic.

It is the ethic which gives rise to the principle

of academic freedom.

And at Lawrence, it is the ethic from which our

Honor Code is derived.

The Honor Code expresses our communal commitment

to the academic virtue of the ethic of truth; the Code does not create
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that commitment but only embodies it.

Ideally, we should pledge allegiance

to that Code and to the ethic for which it stands.

Unhappily, however,

students too often misunderstand the Honor Code as simply a set of rules
and procedures for writing papers, conducting experiments, and taking tests.
Thus, students often fail to connect the nature of a violation to the larger
principle that is at stake.

To fail to cite sources or to paraphrase another's

argument without giving proper acknowledgment is not just to transgress

some arcane technical procedure invented by fusty intellectuals.

It is to

damage the very spirit, purpose, and value of intellectual inquiry.

Hence,

plagiarism, cheating, and deception do not merely violate the Honor Code,
but they destroy the integrity of the community.

The Honor Code, then, is

not only an institutional device; it represents a personal requirement and
responsibility for the community's

well.~ being ..

Our concern with Honor Code violations is legitimate, but we
must not give in to the simple seduction of assuming that the problem is
merely one of student deceit in response to ulterior motives or so-called
academic pressure.

The problem

h~re

may have other sources, among them the

failure of colleges and universities to be more explicit and forward in
proclaiming and enacting the larger purposes of their enterprise.
Let me try to elaborate that potentially obscure and
statement.

~mplex

Fundamentally, the root question that informs higher education has

to do with what it means to be human.

The claims of and for such education--

especially liberal education--often transcend, even disregard, the curricular
structure of colleges and universities.
Herbert Spencer:

Here are a few examples:

to wit,

"Education has for its object the formation of character"; to

wit, William Mather Lewis: "Education is not concerned primarily with intellectual luxuries, but with elements which make the individual a valuable member
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of society 11 ; to wit, the Lawrence catalogue of 1934: "The ultimate purpose
[of Lawrence] is the establishment and improvement of standards--standards of
thought and expression, of taste and interest, of character and ethics, of
health and sane living. 11

These statements, and the many others like them that can be adduced
to make the point, suggest a concern with the consequences of education that
relate not so much to intelligence as to character and citizenship.

In short,

they relate to questions of the nature of being human and of being members of
a civic or even global community.

Usually, however, such claims are made at

the beginning and at the end of a student's college experience and are
rarely invoked or addressed throughout it.

The dilemma for us today is

that the university has become so fragmented into divisions, departments, and
disciplines that these larger claims for education can .become at least
diffused and at worst abandoned.
In one important respect, of course, this diffusion is explicable
even as the abandonment is lamentable.

It is explicable

for all sorts of

right reasons, among them the growing methodological sophistication of the
disciplines and the attending specialization of academic research.

We have

assuredly gained much, in knowledge and insight, by these developments.

But

accompanying them is the insidious temptation--at least as perceived from
the perspective of the liberal arts college--for the teacher or student to be
drawn further and deeper into areas of restricted and rarified disciplinary
technique and interest and hence away from the broader questions and concerns
that affect us as humans.
Graduate schools often, maybe usually, perpetuate this mentality and
treat this temptation as a blessing.

And for some years now, Lawrence has

recognized that it cannot take its clues regarding its mission and style
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from those graduate programs which seem bent on producing Ph.D.s who know
more and more about less and less and whose idea of teaching is little different

from cloning.

What we have been faced with, Alston Chase wrote, are academics

who, "having received a highly specialized schooling in graduate school, regarded

themselves as specialists training other specialists in the same field.

Thus

a professor of philosophy would teach philosophy to students who would become
teachers of philosophy, and so on, apparently forever."

That definition of

teaching runs precisely counter to the aims of liberal education.
W. Jackson Bate, in a recent article on "The Crisis in English

Studies," spoke to a similar point.

Bate criticized the consequences of

excessive specialization in the field, especially as it relates to the
narrowing of interest and expertise, the accompanying emphasis on mastery of
minute subareas, and the resulting loss of range and breadth.

At the end

of his essay, Bate calls for a return to a broader, more humanistic vision.
"Most intelligent people," he writes, "do occasionally ask what life is all
about.

Of course, this can be overdone, and we end in paralysis.

Yet if

English Studies [and we might extend his claim here to encompass the liberal
arts and science disciplines collectively] say that these questions are not only
unanswerable but not even worth asking, they are flying the white flag of
surrender."
Bate's caution is worth heeding.

What it suggests is that it is

possible for the professional preoccupations of a discipline's practitioners
to blunt the discipline's connections with the objects and topics i t is
supposed to illuminate and with the questions of meaning and purpose that
students might properly ask.
among the more culpable here.

My own field of American Studies may well be
For the past few decades the literature of the
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field has contained books and articles attempting to theorize about American

Studies, seeking to legitimize the field, trying to define and describe its
methodology.

This pursuit passed beyond the sublime several years ago when

some scholars began constructing elaborate theories of "interdisciplinarity"-a bogus word which was a fitting description of what had become a bogus quest.
Exploring the American experience in its many facets had been subsumed to a more
abstract and arcane search for disciplinary legitimacy.
Beyond what might be styled the self-aggrandizing tendencies of the
disciplines, higher education today suffers from another tendency that helps
to explain our present situation.

As Richard Morrill has argued, we too often

adopt a view of the student that assumes that as a learner he or she is split
betWeen reason and emotion, knowledge and action, cognition and affection, and
lives in a world in which facts are separated from values.

If and where this

view dominates, higher education can become an arena in which questions of
morality, ethics, and values have no standing since they are consigned
precisely to that part of the learner not addressed in the classroom.

When

values are excluded from intellectual discourse or academic inquiry, they are
located in the realms of emotion on the one hand or personal preference on the
other and thus beyond the purview of education.

Values, then, become an

expression of one's feelings or opinions and are neither counted nor challenged
in the learning process.
There is no easy remedy for this situation and any effort to address this
issue is likely to illust·rate the observation and warning of the philosopher
Ludwig Wittgenstein.

11

Values. 11 he wrote.

stammer when you talk about them.

11

11

A terrible business.

You can at best

Well, it may be time for us to stammer.

It

may be time for us to open ourselves to explorations of values, not to set out
to establish or even seek uniformity of values but at least to admit issues of
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values and ethics to a central place in our academic community.

Put in another way, we should not only tolerate but even embrace
questions of personal commitment in our teaching and learning.

This mode, of

course, once permeated Lawrence and other independent colleges and universities,

either in the form of explicitly religious convictions or of clearly-stated
rules of behavior and conduct.
recapture that mode.

I am not suggesting that we attempt to

But I do think that we need to examine the contours and

consequences of our present state in which we eschew questions of personal
commitment, avoid questions of morality and ethics, and adopt a kind of
relativistic posture toward values.

As a result, we invite a timidity about

such matters that bodes ill for our aspirations regarding character and

citizenship.
Last year I heard an anecdote that illustrates this point.

In an

introductory philosophy course, the instructor was attempting to alert the

students to the kinds of issues and forms of inquiry that the class would be
confronting.

"OK," the professor said, "how many of you believe in God?"

one student raised a hand.

"All right, then," the professor went on,

many of you don't believe in God?"

Not

how

Again, not one student raised a hand.

Turning to a student in the front row, the professor said "Look.

believe in God or you don't believe in God.
replied, "I don't know.

11

Which is it?"

I wasn't in class yesterday."

Either you

And the student

It may have been at

this same college where the dean distributed a survey asking if students were
prepared to make commitments.

Five percent responded yes and five percent

answered no.

This indeed may be timidity, but we find similar behavior appearing
in the guise of intellectual sophistication.

I can recall this kind of

situation in divinity school where practically every statement uttered about the
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Bible or the faith was prefaced with .. Bultmann says 11 or "Brunner argues"
or

11

Barth claims" so that what was being forwarded was almost always cloaked

in the language of some distant and/or dead European theologian and never in
the words or out of the conviction of the speaker.

Thus, if the statement was

challenged, the speaker was not implicated; Bultmann, Brunner, or Barth was.
Hence, discussions and conversations often became little more than intellectual
party-games·of quoting third-party authorities back and forth.

One of my

professors articulated a principled rationale for this activity by

~sserting

that

his role was to be sure that students could identify the furniture of the
household of faith, but not to concern himself with whether or not they used
that furniture or were members of the household.
In an important respect, of course, we applaud this kind of scholarly
objectivity and non-doctrinaire approach.

To educate is not to indoctrinate

and that holds for religious belief, political ideology, or personal conviction.
At the same time, however, we do not want to lapse unwittingly into the position
where we are subtly indoctrinating students to consider value judgments as
intellectually below the salt. We do not want our fealty to objectivity to
banish value questions to the nether realm of idiosyncratic preference.

We

often find, I think, that in our discourse in the university, the ultimate
put-down, the all-time showstopper, the true mark of erudition is to look
someone who has just commented on the worthiness or unworthiness of an idea
or project stone cold dead in the eye and say, with just a hint of a sneer,
11

that's a value judgment. 11

And everybody else nods sagely and sympathetically,

pitying the poor blighter who has just exposed hinself to be so egregiously
un-academic.
Here is a classic illustration of treating values as simply personal
preferences, as merely matters of opinion.

It is an emanation of the relativ-

izing tendency that is embedded in higher education today in which matters of
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judgment, taste, and value are either denied or else treated as ancillary.
What we create, therefore, is a situation in which judgment gives way to
opinion, tast;e to preference, and value to feeling.

When questions of values

and of human significance have no standing in academic and intellectual
pursuits, or when they are admitted only as a way of illustrating that there
are competing values to be considered--that right and wrong fall under the

same category of "it all depends"--then we have said that such questions
really don't matter, are apart from our central preoccupations, and are in
fact matters of opinion, preference, and feeling.
I am obviously not suggesting that the solution is to impose values

as an ingredient of instruction or to test for values on examinations.

I am

arguing that questions of human significance--of judgment, taste, and value-should not be precluded from our teaching and learning.

The challenge, I

believe, is to seek and steer a middle course between routinized relativism
on the one side and intellectual indoctrination on the other.

We need to

rediscover the capacity to ask of ourselves and each other the devastating
question "So what?"

and to confront vexing issues of values and human concern

squarely, honestly, and openly.
In a fine speech to the entering students last Sunday, Illene Noppe
made reference to the work of William Perry, who argued that during the
college experience, students· move from a position of moral absolutism to one
of moral relativism, a move which Perry views as

salutary.~

It is worth noting,

however, that 'Perry also claims that there is a further move past moral relativism
to a posture of personal affirmation of cerbain truths and values.

The

question for us, I would suggest, is to ask whether students move along
this spectrum as a matter of course or whether there is anything in the
teaching-learning process or in the college environment which assists or
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promotes their doing so.

My suspicion is, first, that we have collectively

paid little heed to this question.

My concern is, second, that insofar as we

have considered the question, we may be assuming the former answer when we should
have been worrying about the latter.

In short--and to repeat--I' do not think

that our aspirations for the development of character and citizenship should be

expressed only as prologue and afterwo-rd to a Lawrence education; they should

be in the text as well.
The refusal to consider and address these matters in our teaching

and learning may be one of liberal education's chief liabilities.

As

President Frank Rhodes of Cornell University has pointed out, liberal education
often tends to emphasize qualities of "liberation from 11 without paying
sufficient attention to questions of "liberation for." "Liberation from
certain things is a means and not an end," he wrote. "Its purpose is to
allow informed commitment rather than rootless abstention.

Our colleges

today are more successful in challenging assumptions than in encouraging
conclusions, more concerned with analysis than synthesis.

This reflects

the temper of the age but it has its dangers, for a liberal education,
narrowly conceived, can turn a man or woman into a permanent critic, a
convinced cynic, a detached observer of society, rather than a persuaded
participant."
As aims of education, informed commitment, conclusions, and synthesis
are compatible with attention to judgment, taste, and values in our teaching

and learning. How this is to be accomplished in given cases needs our thought
and attention.

That it can enliven and enrich our mission seems to me a

hope that we all should share.

There is a marvelous passage in Robert Pirsig' s

Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance in which the author/teacher confronts
his English class after he gave an assignment on "What is quality in thought
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and statement? 11

He writes:

The atmosphere was explosive.

Almost everyone seemed as frustrated

and angered as he had been by the question.
to know what quality is?" they said.

"How are we supposed

"You're supposed to tell us!"

Then he told them he couldn't figure it out either and really wanted
to know.

He had assigned it in the hope that somebody would come

up with a good answer.

That ignited it.

The roar of indignation shook the room.

Before the commotion had settled down another teacher had .stuck

his head in the door to see what the trouble was.
"It's all right," Phaedrus said.

"We just accidently stumbled

over a genuine question, and the shock is hard to recover from. 11
Perhaps we will not create shocks as dramatic as Pirsig's fictive
one.

But perhaps too we should begin to consider ways to register something

on the classroom Richter scale.

Professor David Price of Duke University

provides a direction for us here in his discussion of courses in ethics
and public policy.

Such a course, he argues, "should sensitize students

to their own value commitments and to those embedded in the ideological
and cultural premises they accept and the analytical techniques they employ.
It should also force them to consider alternative, competing values and perspectives.

But I am reluctant to leave it at that:

students should move

beyond the appreciation of complexity to making and justifying some of the
hard ethical choices that must, in fact, be made.

It is critically important

to move beyond 'laying values out on the table' to precise ethical argument
and analysis."
Price's point is suggestive, not prescriptive.

Precise ethical

argument and analysis may not be the strategy for every situation.

But
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whether one is confronting hard ethical choices in public policy, or issues
of personal identity in psychologyy'Or questions about beauty in art or lit-

erature, or problems of environmental consequences in the sciences, we need to
admit questions of value to the arena of discussion and debate.

The moral

arguments of a poem, the social implications of a political system, the

ethical consequences of a scientific technique, and the human significance of
our responses should have a place in our classrooms and dormitory rooms.

To deny that place is to relinquish any claim or attempt to link thought
and action, knowing and doing.

It is to bifurcate ourselves in ways wholly

contradictory to our larger intentions and ambitions that liberal learning
develop character, inform citizenship, and improve standards.
So I would hope that our collective commitment to the ethic of truth
and our mutual openness to issues of value and human significance will become
evident characteristics of this special place, the Lawrence community.
Rather than focus our attention on the provisions of our Honor Code, we should
instead express our commitment to the ethic of truth that undergirds it.
That is a value which informs our doing and perhaps by our devotion to that
value we can begin the process of receptivity to other values and, in our teaching, and learning and living together enhance and extend the quality of our
lives, individually and together, within and beyond the university.

Then

may Lawrence be a place that embodies the assertion of Plutarch, that
"the very spring and root of honesty and virtue lie in good education."
"Values.
talk about them."

A terrible business.
Wittgenstein was right.

and I have no doubt stammered.

You can at best stammer when you
Values are a terrible business

But I invite all of us to stammer, students and

faculty alike, in classrooms and at lunchtables, in offices and in residence
halls.

Silence is easy. But stammering is at least speech, and we should care
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enough for each other and for our university to talk with one another--to
stammer together--about values.

